The revisionist's guide to responsibility

Philosophical Studies 125 (3):399-429 (2005)
Abstract
Revisionism in the theory of moral responsibility is the idea that some aspect of responsibility practices, attitudes, or concept is in need of revision. While the increased frequency of revisionist language in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is striking, what discussion there has been of revisionism about responsibility and free will tends to be critical. In this paper, I argue that at least one species of revisionism, moderate revisionism, is considerably more sophisticated and defensible than critics have realized. I go on to argue for the advantages of moderate revisionist theories over standard compatibilist and incompatibilist theories
Keywords Error  Free Will  Metaphysics  Responsibility  Revisionism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-7783-z
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Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.
The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.
The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-290.

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