In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave (2010)
AbstractI’ve been told that in the good old days of the 1970s, when Quine’s desert landscapes were regarded as ideal real estate and David Lewis and John Rawls had not yet left a legion of inﬂuential students rewriting the terrain of metaphysics and ethics respectively, compatibilism was still compatibilism about free will. And, of course, incompatibilism was still incompatibilism about free will. That is, compatibilism was the view that free will was compatible with determinism. Incompatibilism was the view that free will was incompatible with determinism.1 What philosophers argued about was whether free will was compatible with determinism. Mostly, this was an argument about how to understand claims that one could do otherwise. You needn’t have bothered to talk about moral responsibility, because it was just obvious that you couldn’t have moral responsibility without free will. The literature was a temple of clarity. Then, somehow, things began to go horribly wrong. To be sure, there had been some activity in the 1960s that would have struck some observers as ominous. Still, it was not until the 1980s that those initial warning signs gave way to real trouble. The meanings of terms twisted
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Similar books and articles
Revisionist Accounts of Free Will: Origins, Varieties, and Challenges.Manuel Vargas - 2011 - In Robert Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will, 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press.
Incompatibilism, Nondeterministic Causation, and the Real Problem of Free Will.Patrick Francken - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Research 18:37-63.
How to Solve the Problem of Free Will.Manuel Vargas - 2013 - In Paul Russell & Oisin Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings From the Contemporary Debates. Oup Usa. pp. 400.
Revisionism About Free Will: A Statement and Defense.Manuel Vargas - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):45-62.
Intuitions About Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing.Eddy Nahmias - 2011 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition. Oxford University Press.
Assuming Determinism, Free Will Can Only Be an Illusion: An Argument for Incompatibilism.Ariel Yadin - 2004 - Iyyun 53 (July):275-286.
Five Questions on Philosophy of Action.Manuel Vargas - 2009 - In Jesus Aguilar & Andre Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions. Automatic/VIP Press.
Common Sense, Strict Incompatibilism, and Free Will.Boris Rähme - 2013 - Philosophical Inquiries 1 (1):107-124.