Authors
Olav Vassend
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences
Abstract
Scientists and Bayesian statisticians often study hypotheses that they know to be false. This creates an interpretive problem because the Bayesian probability of a hypothesis is supposed to represent the probability that the hypothesis is true. I investigate whether Bayesianism can accommodate the idea that false hypotheses are sometimes approximately true or that some hypotheses or models can be closer to the truth than others. I argue that the idea that some hypotheses are approximately true in an absolute sense is hard to square with Bayesianism, but that the notion that some hypotheses are comparatively closer to the truth than others can be made compatible with Bayesianism, and that this provides an adequate and potentially useful solution to the interpretive problem. Finally, I compare my ``verisimilitude'' solution to the interpretive problem with a ``counterfactual'' solution recently proposed by Jan Sprenger.
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Conjectures and Refutations.K. Popper - 1963 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
Ockham’s Razors: A User’s Manual.Elliott Sober - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.

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