Synthese 100 (1):39 - 48 (1994)
The aim of this paper is to introduce a logically grounded approach to action semantics and action interpretation. The main idea is to present the context of action as a set of questions demanding an action to answer. I introduce (a) a basic procedure of action interpretation, which is a reformulation of Hilpinen's semantical procedure for imperatives; (b) a procedure of what-interpretation; (c) a procedure of why-interpretation. The conditions of mutual reducibility of interpretation procedures are explicated. The paper concludes by putting forth the problem of interpretive bounds of moral responsibility.
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References found in this work BETA
Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.
The Intelligibility of Action.Alasdair MacIntyre - 1986 - In Joseph Margolis, Michael Krausz & Richard M. Burian (eds.), Rationality, Relativism, and the Human Sciences. M. Nijhoff. pp. 63--80.
Role and Rational Action.Margaret Urban Coyne - 1984 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 14 (3):259–275.
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