Erkenntnis 79 (S1):173-183 (2014)

Authors
Katia Vavova
Mount Holyoke College
Abstract
Should learning we disagree about p lead you to reduce confidence in p? Some who think so want to except beliefs in which you are rationally highly confident. I argue that this is wrong; we should reject accounts that rely on this intuitive thought. I then show that quite the opposite holds: factors that justify low confidence in p also make disagreement about p less significant. I examine two such factors: your antecedent expectations about your peers’ opinions and the difficulty of evaluating your evidence. I close by proposing a different way of thinking about disagreement.
Keywords Disagreement  Rational Self-Doubt  Confidence  Epistemology  Rationality  Evidence  Higher Order Evidence  Humility  Skepticism  Moral Skepticism
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9451-6
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.

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Citations of this work BETA

Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.
Respecting All the Evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.
Moral Disagreement and Moral Skepticism.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333.
Belief Dependence: How Do the Numbers Count?Zach Barnett - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):297-319.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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