Moral disagreement and moral skepticism

Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333 (2014)

Authors
Katia Vavova
Mount Holyoke College
Abstract
The fact of moral disagreement when conjoined with Conciliationism, an independently attractive view about the epistemic significance disagreement, seems to entail moral skepticism. This worries those who like Conciliationism, the independently attractive view, but dislike moral skepticism. Others, equally inclined against moral skepticism, think this is a reductio of Conciliationism. I argue that they are both wrong. There is no reductio and nothing to worry about.
Keywords moral disagreement  skepticism  disagreement  epistemology  metaethics  rationality  belief revision  higher-order evidence  fundamental disagreement  rational
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DOI 10.1111/phpe.12049
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References found in this work BETA

Debunking Evolutionary Debunking.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:76-101.
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Why Do We Disagree About Our Obligations to the Poor?Peter Seipel - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-16.
Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
Might Moral Epistemologists Be Asking The Wrong Questions?Caleb Perl - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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