A Theory of Hedged Moral Principles

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:91-132 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper offers a general model of substantive moral principles as a kind of hedged moral principles that can (but don't have to) tolerate exceptions. I argue that the kind of principles I defend provide an account of what would make an exception to them permissible. I also argue that these principles are nonetheless robustly explanatory with respect to a variety of moral facts; that they make sense of error, uncertainty, and disagreement concerning moral principles and their implications; and that one can grasp these principles without having to grasp any particular list of their permissibly exceptional instances. I conclude by pointing out various advantages that this model of principles has over several of its rivals. The bottom line is that we should find nothing peculiarly odd or problematic about the idea of exception-tolerating and yet robustly explanatory moral principles.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A Theory of Hedged Moral Principles.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 91-132.
Usable moral principles.Pekka Väyrynen - 2007 - In Matjaž Potrc, Vojko Strahovnik & Mark Lance (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism. New York: Routledge. pp. 75-106.
Moral Principles Are Not Moral Laws.Luke Robinson - 2007 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (3):1-22.
The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15.
Moral Principles as Generics.Ravi Thakral - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (2):205-224.
Particularism and the Point of Moral Principles.Rebecca Lynn Stangl - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):201-229.
Defending Particularism.Jonathan Dancy - 1999 - Metaphilosophy 30 (1&2):25-32.
How to Preach.Michael McDermott - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):633 - 652.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
594 (#32,581)

6 months
177 (#21,808)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Pekka Väyrynen
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Grounding and Normative Explanation.Pekka Väyrynen - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):155-178.
Reasons and Moral Principles.Pekka Väyrynen - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 839-61.
The Ethical Basis for Veganism.Tristram McPherson - 2017 - In Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson & Tyler Doggett (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics. Oxford University Press.

View all 33 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references