Resisting the buck-passing account of value

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:295-324 (2006)
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Abstract

I first distinguish between different forms of the buck-passing account of value and clarify my target in other respects on buck-passers' behalf. I then raise a number of problems for the different forms of the buck-passing view that I have distinguished.

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Pekka Väyrynen
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Value-Based Theory of Reasons.Barry Maguire - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
Value and Reasons to Favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.
Value Theory.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Reasons as Explanations.John Brunero - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.

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