Knowing what's not up the road by seeing what's right in front of you: Epistemological disjunctivism's fake barn problem
Episteme 12 (3):401-412 (2015)
AbstractEpistemological Disjunctivism is the view that rational support for paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge that P comes from seeing that P – a state that is both factive and reflectively accessible. ED has the consequence that if I see that there is a barn before me, I can thereby be in a position to know that I am not in fake barn country. It is argued that this is a problem. The problem is distinct from familiar complaints about Neo-Mooreanism and easy knowledge. Potential ways of avoiding this problem are proposed. It is argued that they do not succeed. There is a way out of ED's fake barn problem but many will likely find it inhospitable
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Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge.Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.