Social robots and the intentional stance

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e47 (2023)
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Abstract

Why is it that people simultaneously treat social robots as mere designed artefacts, yet show willingness to interact with them as if they were real agents? Here, we argue that Dennett's distinction between the intentional stance and the design stance can help us to resolve this puzzle, allowing us to further our understanding of social robots as interactive depictions.

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Author Profiles

Walter Veit
University of Reading
Heather Browning
University of Southampton

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