The rationale of rationalization

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43:e53 (2019)
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Abstract

While we agree in broad strokes with the characterisation of rationalization as a “useful fiction,” we think that Fiery Cushman's claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: the reality of beliefs and desires, that is, the fictional status of folk-psychological entities and the degree to which they should be understood as useful. Our aim is to clarify both points and explicate the rationale of rationalization.

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Author Profiles

Walter Veit
University of Reading
Max Jones
University of Bristol
Joe Dewhurst
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
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Citations of this work

Model Pluralism.Walter Veit - 2019 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 50 (2):91-114.
Perspectival pluralism for animal welfare.Walter Veit & Heather Browning - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-14.
Agential thinking.Walter Veit - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5):13393-13419.
The evolution of knowledge during the Cambrian explosion.Walter Veit - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44:e174.

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