Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):411-423 (2007)
What we normally think of as the “physical world” is also the world as experienced, that is, a world of appearances. Given this, what is the reality behind the appearances, and what might its relation be to consciousness and to constructive processes in the mind? According to Kant, the thing itself that brings about and supports these appearances is unknowable and we can never gain any understanding of how it brings such appearances about. Reflexive monism argues the opposite: the thing itself is knowable as are the processes that construct conscious appearances. Conscious appearances (empirical evidence) and the theories derived from them can represent what the world is really like, even though such empirical knowledge is partial, approximate and uncertain, and conscious appearances are species-specific constructions of the human mind. Drawing on the writings of Husserl, Hoche suggests that problems of knowledge, mind and consciousness are better understood in terms of a “pure noematic” phenomenology that avoids any reference to a “thing itself.” I argue that avoiding reference to a knowable reality (behind appearances) leads to more complex explanations with less explanatory value and counterintuitive conclusions—for example Hoche’s conclusion that consciousness is not part of nature. The critical realism adopted by reflexive monism appears to be more useful, as well as being consistent with science and common sense. Key words reflexive monism . thing itself . Kant . Husserl . Hoche .
|Keywords||reflexive monism thing itself Kant Husserl phenomenology noematic knowledge consciousness Hoche Velmans|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Is Human Information Processing Conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective.Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.
Consciousness, Brain, and the Physical World.Max Velmans - 1990 - Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):77-99.
Heterophenomenology Vs. Critical Phenomenology.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):221-230.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Contemporary Anti-Realism.Lucy Allais - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):369 – 392.
Psychophysical Nature.Max Velmans - 2007 - In Harald Atmanspacher & Hans Primas (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Springer.
From Being to Givenness and Back: Some Remarks on the Meaning of Transcendental Idealism in Kant and Husserl.Sebastian Luft - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):367-394.
'Reflexive Monism' Versus 'Complementarism': An Analysis and Criticism of the Conceptual Groundwork of Max Velmans's 'Reflexive Model' of Consciousness.Prof em Dr Hans-Ulrich Hoche - 2006 - [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press).
Reflexive Monism Versus Complementarism: An Analysis and Criticism of the Conceptual Groundwork of Max Velmans's Reflexive Model of Consciousness.Hans-Ulrich Hoche - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):389-409.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads156 ( #28,764 of 2,152,457 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #225,917 of 2,152,457 )
How can I increase my downloads?