How to define consciousness—and how not to define consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):139-156 (2009)

Authors
Max Velmans
Goldsmiths College, University of London
Abstract
Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious. Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives example of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical commitments (about the nature of consciousness, mind and world) have intruded into definitions. Similar problems can arise in the way a “conscious process” is defined, potentially obscuring the way that conscious phenomenology actually relates to its neural correlates and antecedent causes in the brain, body and external world. Once a definition of “consciousness” is firmly grounded in its phenomenology, investigations of its ontology and its relationships to entities, events and processes that are not conscious can begin, and this may in time transmute the meaning (or sense) of the term. As our scientific understanding of these relationships deepen, our understanding of what consciousness is will also deepen. A similar transmutation of meaning (with growth of knowledge) occurs with basic terms in physics such as "energy", and "time.".
Keywords definition of consciousness  definition of conscious process  unconscious processing  preconscious processing  reductionism  functionalism  definition of mind
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References found in this work BETA

A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

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Citations of this work BETA

Meanings Attributed to the Term Consciousness: An Overview.Ram Vimal - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):9-27.
Phenomenal and Access Consciousness and the "Hard" Problem: A View From the Designer Stance.Aaron Sloman - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):117-169.
Levels of Consciousness.Wojciech Pisula - 2016 - Open Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):51-58.
A Computational Model of Machine Consciousness.Janusz A. Starzyk & Dilip K. Prasad - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (02):255-281.

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