Authors
Max Velmans
Goldsmiths College, University of London
Abstract
Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to how the “phenomenal world” relates to the “physical world”, the “world itself”, and processing in the brain. In order to place the theory within the context of current thought and debate, I address questions that have been raised about reflexive monism in recent commentaries and also evaluate competing accounts of the same issues offered by “transparency theory” and by “biological naturalism”. I argue that, of the competing views on offer, reflexive monism most closely follows the contours of ordinary experience, the findings of science, and common sense.
Keywords reflexive monism  dualism  reductionism  physicalism  functionalism  transparency  biological naturalism  phenomenal world  physical world  brain  perceptual projection
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References found in this work BETA

A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Dover Publications.

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Citations of this work BETA

Neutral Monism.Leopold Stubenberg - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
How to Define Consciousness—and How Not to Define Consciousness.Prof Max Velmans - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):139-156.
Dual-Aspect Monism À la Pauli and Jung.Harald Atmanspacher - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):9-10.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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Understanding Consciousness, Edition 2.Max Velmans - 2009 - Routledge/Psychology Press.
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Understanding Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2000 - London: Routledge.
Dualism, Reductionism, and Reflexive Monism.Max Velmans - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell. pp. 346-358.

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