Understanding Consciousness, Edition 2

Routledge/Psychology Press (2009)

Authors
Max Velmans
Goldsmiths College, University of London
Abstract
A current, comprehensive summary of Velmans' theoretical work that updates and deepens the analysis given in Edition 1. Part 1 reviews the strengths and weaknesses of all currently dominant theories of consciousness in a form suitable for undergraduates, postgraduates and researchers focusing mainly on dualism, physicalism, functionalism and consciousness in machines. Part 2 gives a new analysis of consciousness, grounded in its everyday phenomenology, which undermines the basis of the dualism versus reductionist debate. It also examines the consequences for realism versus idealism, subjectivity, intersubjectivity and objectivity, and the relation of consciousness to brain processing. Part 3 gives a new synthesis, with a novel approach to understanding what consciousness is and what consciousness does. It also introduces Reflexive Monism, an alternative to dualism and reductionism that is consistent with the findings of science and with common sense.
Keywords consciousness  mind  reflexive monism  dualism  physicalism  functionalism  brain  information processing  first person science  third-person science
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References found in this work BETA

Representationalism About Consciousness.William E. Seager & David Bourget - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 261-276.

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Citations of this work BETA

How to Define Consciousness—and How Not to Define Consciousness.Prof Max Velmans - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):139-156.

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Similar books and articles

Making Sense of Causal Interactions Between Consciousness and Brain.Max Velmans - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):69-95.
Consciousness and the "Causal Paradox".Max Velmans - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):538-542.
A Natural Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2001 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1):39-59.
Consciousness, Brain, and the Physical World.Max Velmans - 1990 - Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):77-99.
Goodbye to Reductionism: Complementary First and Third-Person Approaches to Consciousness.Max Velmans - 1998 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. Cambridge: Mass.: MIT Press. pp. 45-52.
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Understanding Consciousness.I. Gois - 2001 - Disputatio 10:3-21.
Understanding Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2000 - London: Routledge.

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