Mind 101 (403):461-481 (1992)

Authors
J. David Velleman
New York University
Abstract
What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw that will concern me in this paper is that the story fails to include an agent-or, more precisely, fails to cast the agent in his proper role.
Keywords Free Will   Action   Mental Causation   Davidson
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DOI 10.1093/mind/101.403.461
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References found in this work BETA

Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.

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Citations of this work BETA

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