Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (1):71-88 (2022)

Authors
Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran
University of Marburg
Abstract
A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three most common answers provided by contemporary philosophy explain the consciousness of value in terms of judgment, emotion, or perception. An alternative view endorsed mainly by authors inspired by the phenomenological tradition argues that values are apprehended by an intentional feeling. In this model, it is by virtue of a feeling that objects are presented as being in different degrees and nuances fair or unfair, boring or funny, good or bad. This paper offers an account of this model of feeling and its basic features, and defends it over alternative models. To this end, the paper discusses different versions of the model circulating in current research which until now have developed in parallel rather than in mutual exchange. The paper also applies the proposed account to the moral domain and examines how a feeling of values is presupposed by several moral experiences.
Keywords consciousness of value  feeling of value  feeling  emotion  value  moral value  moral experience
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Reprint years 2022
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-021-10244-x
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References found in this work BETA

Value, Reality, and Desire.Graham Oddie - 2005 - Clarendon Press.
Moral Perception.Robert Audi - 2013 - Princeton University Press.

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