Dynamic disagreement

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (8):1116-1141 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX


ABSTRACT Ordinary thinkers are not only capable of keeping hold of the same thought across contexts via shifts in the way of thinking. They also possess the ability to do so in a manner that grounds disagreement with respect to other thoughts. In this paper, I elucidate the ensuing phenomenon of dynamic disagreement and introduce the type of account most likely to accommodate its distinctive features. I argue, in particular, that dynamic disagreement requires the postulation of dynamic concepts or concepts that display a number of ways of thinking in different contexts. Finally, I suggest that alternative approaches to dynamic thought face difficulty in fully capturing the phenomenon.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,420

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Capturing Dynamic Conceptual Frames.Rafal Urbaniak - 2010 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 18 (3):430-455.
Convergence, Community, and Force in Aesthetic Discourse.Nick Riggle - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (47).
A Bayesian Solution to Hallsson's Puzzle.Thomas Mulligan - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (10):1914-1927.
Conceptual Disagreement.Sarah Stroud - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):15-28.


Added to PP

14 (#1,011,301)

6 months
9 (#452,266)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Víctor M. Verdejo
Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references