Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)

Authors
Matthew Vermaire
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
Doxastic involuntarists, as I categorize them, think it is impossible to form a belief as an intentional action. Considering several ways of elaborating that idea, I argue that none of them makes for an attractive view: if belief-formation is understood in some ways, then involuntarism is false; if in others, involuntarism is insignificant. I also examine several arguments purporting to show that the truth of involuntarism is metaphysically necessary, and I contend that they suffer from the same kind of difficulty: each lacks either soundness or significance. I conclude that involuntarism, if it’s to be viable, will need further development of the concept of belief-formation.
Keywords doxastic voluntarism  intention  believing at will  belief-formation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
Equal Treatment for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.
The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
Attitudinal Control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Belief Control and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.
Doxastic Involuntarism and Evidentialism.Joseph Gamache - 2017 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 91:81-92.
A New Rejection of Doxastic Voluntarism.Sergi Rosell - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):97-112.
Faith, Belief, and Control.Lindsay Rettler - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):95-109.
Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence.Danny Frederick - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.
Ought to Believe.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370.
Desiring To Believe.Grace Yee - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):446-455.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-06-02

Total views
78 ( #137,334 of 2,448,359 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
78 ( #7,744 of 2,448,359 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes