On the Normativity of Intentions

Topoi 33 (1):87-101 (2014)
Bruno Verbeek
Leiden University
Suppose you intend now to φ at some future time t. However, when t has come you do not φ. Something has gone wrong. This failing is not just a causal but also a normative failing. This raises the question how to characterize this failing. I discuss three alternative views. On the first view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy only if the balance of reasons pointed to φ-ing. The fact that you intended to φ does not add to the reasons for φ-ing at t. On the second view, the fact that you do not execute your intention to φ is blameworthy because you violate a requirement of rationality. Both these views have in common that they deny that intending to φ at t creates a reason to φ at t. The third alternative, the one I defend, claims that you often create reasons to φ by intending to φ
Keywords Intention  Reasons  Requirements  Rationality  Authority
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-013-9221-8
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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