Claudine Verheggen
York University
Hannah Ginsborg has recently offered a new account of normativity, according to which normative attitudes are essential to the meaningful use of language. The kind of normativity she has in mind –– not semantic but ‘primitive’ — is supposed to help us to avoid the pitfalls of both non-reductionist and reductive dispositionalist theories of meaning. For, according to her, it enables us both to account for meaning in non-semantic terms, which non-reductionism cannot do, and to make room for the normativity of meaning, which reductive dispositionalism cannot do. I argue that the main problem with Ginsborg’s account is that it fails to say what makes it possible for expressions to be governed by conditions of correct application to begin with. I do believe, however, that normative attitudes are essential to meaning, but they have to be thought of as fully semantic. And I suggest that conditions of correct application can be present only when those attitudes are present
Keywords philosophy of language  normativity  hannah ginsborg  dispositionalism  non-reductionism
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DOI 10.1080/09672559.2015.1042005
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Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Paul Horwich - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (1):163-171.
Wittgenstein on Following a Rule.John McDowell - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):325-364.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Normativity of Meaning and Content.Kathrin Glüer & Asa Wikforss - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Davidson’s Answer to Kripke’s Sceptic.Olivia Sultanescu & Claudine Verheggen - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (2):8-28.
Meaning, Evidence, and Objectivity.Olivia Sultanescu - 2021 - In Syraya Chin-Mu Yang & Robert H. Myers (eds.), Donald Davidson on Action, Mind and Value. pp. 171-184.
Ginsborg on a Kantian-Brandomian View of Concepts.Byeong D. Lee - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (1):56-74.

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