Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2):183-200 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX


It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,420

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Pierre’s rational and public beliefs.Victor Verdejo - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3):451-469.
Tensed Belief.Vasilis Tsompanidis - 2011 - Dissertation, University of California Santa Barbara
Unificatory Understanding and Explanatory Proofs.Joachim Frans - 2020 - Foundations of Science 26 (4):1105-1127.
Semantics for Belief Attributions.Leah Savion - 1989 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Religious Belief, Occurrent Thought, and Reasonable Disagreement: A Response to Tim Crane.Eva Schmidt - 2023 - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 65 (4):438-446.
Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription.Stephan Torre - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):112-132.
Leibniz on the existence of atoms.Ricardo Mena - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (2):19-38.
Do honeybees have concepts?Bernardo Aguilera Dreyse - 2011 - Disputatio 4 (30):1 - 19.


Added to PP

48 (#326,895)

6 months
11 (#348,228)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Víctor M. Verdejo
Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Citations of this work

Fully Understanding Concept Possession.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2018 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 50 (148):3-27.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
A puzzle about belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.
Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege.Gottlob Frege - 1952 - Oxford, England: Blackwell. Edited by P. T. Geach & Max Black.

View all 35 references / Add more references