Divine determinism, human freedom, and the consequence argument

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71 (2):145-155 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I consider the view, held by some Thomistic thinkers, that divine determinism is compatible with human freedom, even though natural determinism is not. After examining the purported differences between divine and natural determinism, I discuss the Consequence Argument, which has been put forward to establish the incompatibility of natural determinism and human freedom. The Consequence Argument, I note, hinges on the premise that an action ultimately determined by factors outside of the actor’s control is not free. Since, I argue, divine determinism also entails that human actions are ultimately determined by factors outside of the actors’ control, I suggest that a parallel argument to the Consequence Argument can be constructed for the incompatibility of divine determinism and human freedom. I conclude that those who reject natural compatibilism on the basis of the Consequence Argument should also reject divine compatibilism.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,466

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Consequence Argument.Peter van Inwagen - 2008 - In Peter Van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell.
Freedom and Determinism.Jenann Ismael - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations.
So-Far Incompatibilism and the so-Far Consequence Argument.Stephen Hetherington - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):163-178.
Autonomy and Manipulated Freedom.Tomis Kapitan - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):81-104.
On the Impossibility of a Demonstration of Theological Determinism.Guy Mansini - 2004 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78 (4):573-580.
A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?Tomis Kapitan - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 127--157.
The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism.Jason Turner - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-08-03

Downloads
156 (#79,482)

6 months
3 (#210,165)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Leigh Vicens
Augustana University

References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
Causal Determinism.Carl Hoefer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Arguments for Incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 9 references / Add more references