Authors
Agustin Vicente
University of the Basque Country
Agustin Vicente
University of the Basque Country
Abstract
According to an increasing number of authors, the best, if not the only, argument in favour of physicalism is the so-called 'overdetermination argument'. This argument, if sound, establishes that all the entities that enter into causal interactions with the physical world are physical. One key premise in the overdetermination argument is the principle of the causal closure of the physical world, said to be supported by contemporary physics. In this paper, I examine various ways in which physics may support the principle, either as a methodological guide or as depending on some other laws and principles of physics
Keywords A Priori  Causal  Closure  Overdetermination  Physicalism  Physics  Science
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DOI 10.1080/02698590600814332
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References found in this work BETA

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):537-551.
Current Physics and 'the Physical'.Agustín Vicente - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):393-416.
Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review.David Pineda & Agustín Vicente - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):97-120.

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