Ramsey on judgment: The theory of "facts and propositions"

Dialectica 58 (4):499–516 (2004)
Ramsey's “Facts and Propositions” is terse, allusive, and dense. The paper is far from easy to understand. The present essay is an effort, largely following Brian Loar's account,1 to say what Ramsey's goal is, to spell out what he took to be the means to accomplish it, and to show how those means, at least in the terms of F&P, cannot accomplish that end. I also contrast Loar's own account of judgment, explicitly modeled on Ramsey's view, with the latter. The exercise is not at all academic. Loar makes clear the striking depth and originality of Ramsey's insights
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00321.x
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References found in this work BETA
Brian Loar (1981). Mind and Meaning. Cambridge University Press.
Brian Loar (1980). Ramsey's Theory of Belief and Truth. In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 49--69.

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