Rethinking the presumption of innocence

Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (2):193-213 (2006)
Authors
Abstract
This article is concerned with what constitutes interference with the presumption of innocence and what justifications there might be for such interference. It provides a defence of a theory of the presumption of innocence that suggests that the right is interfered with if the offence warrants conviction of defendants who are not the intended target of the offence. This thesis is defended against two alternative theories. It then considers what might justify interference with the presumption of innocence. It explores the idea that interference is justified if it is necessary in a democratic society and considers the presumption in relation to the aims of the criminal trial. It is concluded that no good grounds have been provided for interference with the right, and that the right should be regarded as inviolable
Keywords Presumption of innocence  Democracy  Human rights  Fair trial  Reverse burden of proof
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2007
DOI 10.1007/s11572-006-9016-8
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,537
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Criminal Responsibility.Victor Tadros - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of Innocence.R. A. Duff - 2005 - In Andrew Simester (ed.), Appraising Strict Liability. Oxford University Press. pp. 125-49.
Crime, Prohibition, and Punishment.R. A. Duff - 2002 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2):97–108.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Towards a Modest Legal Moralism.R. A. Duff - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):217-235.
The Right to Be Presumed Innocent.Hamish Stewart - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (2):407-420.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-08-10

Total downloads
135 ( #44,817 of 2,287,748 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #25,924 of 2,287,748 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature