Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):40-41 (1997)

Abstract
Glenberg's account falls short in several respects. Besides requiring clearer explication of basic concepts, his account fails to recognize the autonomous nature of perception. His account of what is remembered, and its description, is too static. His strictures against connectionist modeling might be overcome by combining the notions of psychological space and principled learning in an embodied and situated network.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x97460016
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The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Metaphors We Live By.George Lakoff & Mark Johnson - 1980 - University of Chicago Press.

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