The role of dispositions in explanations

Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (3):301-310 (2010)
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Abstract

According to a model defended by some authors, dispositional concepts can be legitimately used in causal explanations, although such a use is not necessary. I argue, however, that there is a kind of use of dispositions in explanations that does not fall within this model: we will miss some explanations if we forsake dispositional concepts and explanations.

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Agustin Vicente
University of the Basque Country

References found in this work

Supervenience and mind: selected philosophical essays.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Dispositions.Stephen Mumford - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
Functions.Larry Wright - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (2):139-168.
Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes.Andy Clark - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):95-102.

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