The role of dispositions in explanations

Theoria 19 (3):301-310 (2004)

Authors
Agustin Vicente
University of the Basque Country
Agustin Vicente
University of the Basque Country
Abstract
According to a model defended by some authors, dispositional predicates, or concepts, can be legitimately used in causal explanations, but such a use is not necessary. For every explanation couched in dispositional terms, there is always a better, and complete, explanation that makes use of a different vocabulary, that of categorial bases. In what follows, I will develop this view, and then argue that there is a kind of use of dispositions in explanations that does not fall within this model. That is, I will argue that we would miss some explanations if we were to forsake dispositional concepts and dispositional explanations.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Philosophy of Science
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ISBN(s) 0495-4548
DOI theoria20041934
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References found in this work BETA

Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred DRETSKE - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):95-102.
Dispositions. [REVIEW]John W. Carroll - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):82-84.

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Citations of this work BETA

I—Fundamental Powers, Evolved Powers, and Mental Powers.Alexander Bird - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):247-275.
Causation and the Agent’s Point of View.Sebastián Álvarez - 2014 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 29 (1):133-147.

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