How do you know that you settled a question?

Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):199-211 (2015)

Authors
Tillmann Vierkant
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
It is commonly assumed in the philosophical literature that in order to acquire an intention, the agent has to settle a question of what to do in practical deliberation. Carruthers, P. has recently used this to argue that the acquisition of intentions can never be conscious even in cases where the agent asserts having the intention in inner speech. Because of that Carruthers also believes that knowledge of intentions even in first person cases is observational. This paper explores the challenge Carruthers’ argument throws up for accounts that also rely on the notion of settling a question for intention acquisition, but who also want to maintain at the same time that knowledge of intentions in the first person case is not observational.
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2015.1032330
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.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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