Noûs 54 (3):731-751 (2019)

Authors
Emanuel Viebahn
Humboldt-University, Berlin
Abstract
It is widely held that all lies are assertions: the traditional definition of lying entails that, in order to lie, speakers have to assert something they believe to be false. It is also widely held that assertion contrasts with presupposition and, in particular, that one cannot assert something by presupposing it. Together, these views imply that speakers cannot lie with presuppositions—a view that Andreas Stokke has recently explicitly defended. The aim of this paper is to argue that speakers can lie with presuppositions, and to discuss some of the implications this outcome has for current research on lying, assertion and presupposition.
Keywords lying and misleading  presupposition  assertion
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Reprint years 2019, 2020
DOI 10.1111/nous.12282
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References found in this work BETA

Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
What Is Lying.Don Fallis - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (1):29-56.
Asserting.Robert Brandom - 1983 - Noûs 17 (4):637-650.
Lying and Asserting.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.

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Citations of this work BETA

To Lie or to Mislead?Felix Timmermann & Emanuel Viebahn - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1481-1501.
The Aesthetic Significance of the Lying-Misleading Distinction.Jessica Pepp - 2019 - British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (3):289-304.

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