Sképsis (19):76-82 (2019)

Authors
Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues
Federal University of Santa Maria
Abstract
n the first part of the paper I will present Pritchard’s approach to Wittgenstein’s notion of hinge commitments, which is essential to his solution to the closure-based sceptical arguments. And, in the second par of the paper, I will raise some concerns that I have regarding Pritchard’s non-belief reading of the hinge commitments. In the third and final part, I make some concluding remarks regarding Pritchard’s overall strategy to solve the closure-based sceptical paradox.
Keywords Pritchard, Hinge Epistemology, Skepticism.
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