Zombie Mary and the blue banana. On the compatibility of the 'knowledge argument' with the argument from modality

Authors
Tillmann Vierkant
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
This paper is trying to show that it is not possible to use the Knowledge argument as independent evidence for the form of non-reductionism the Modal argument argues for. To show this, Jackson's famous 'Mary' thought experiment is imagined in a zombie world. This leads to the result that there are many problems in the Mary experiment, which cannot have anything to do with phenomenal Qualia, because the Zombie-Mary would encounter them as well, and once all these problems are accounted for, it is no longer clear whether a Zombie-Mary is conceivable at all. Finally, an alternative explanation for the strong non-reductive intuitions of the Mary experiment is discussed
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,484
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Actors Are Not Like Zombies.E. Diaz-Leon - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):115-122.
The Anti-Zombie Argument.Keith Frankish - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):650–666.
Terry, Terry, Quite Contrary.Sven Walter - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):103-22.
The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):393-413.
A Defense of Materialism Against Attacks Based on Qualia.Jeffrey Charles Beall - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Mary's Scientific Knowledge.Luca Malatesti - 2008 - Prolegomena 7 (1):37-59.
Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten.Sam Coleman - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
Of Zombies, Color Scientists, and Floating Iron Bars.Tamler Sommers - 2002 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8.
Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument.Gabriel Rabin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.
Redundancy of the Zombie Argument in The Conscious Mind.Antti Heikinheimo - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6):5-6.
The Knowledge Argument Revisited.James P. Moreland - 2003 - International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):218-228.
Epistemological Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument.Jesper Kallestrup - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):1-23.
Knowing What It is Like and Knowing How.Luca Malatesti - 2004 - In Alberto Peruzzi (ed.), Mind and Causality. John Benjamins. pp. 55--119.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
85 ( #73,386 of 2,268,045 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #373,178 of 2,268,045 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature