Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism

Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):84-103 (2008)
Abstract
I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness is consistent with a version of deflationsim. My line of argument assumes the use conception of meaning. This brings out an interesting consequence since mostly the philosophers who endorse the use conception of meaning, e.g. Paul Horwich, hold that deflationism is inconsistent with the strategy of implementing non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness and thereby urge a reformulation of non-factualism.
Keywords Deflationism  Non-factualism  Use Conception of Meaning
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DOI 10.12697/spe.2008.1.1.05
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