Intuitions on Semantic Reference

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):755-778 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Since Machery et al. _Cognition_ 92, B1-B12 ( 2004 ) attacked Kripke’s refutation of classical descriptivism, their experiment has been repeated several times, in its original version or in some revised ones, by theorists with contrasting intents. Some repeated the experiment for confirming its results, others for proving them unreliable. One striking characteristic of those surveys is that they mostly replicated the data collected in Machery et al.’s _Cognition_ 92, B1-B12, 2004 experiment: less than 60% of Westerners showed preference for the causal-historical response. We side with the critics of Machery et al.’s experiment. In this paper, we present the results of a survey that tests some hypotheses for explaining that percentage of Westerners’ preferences without taking it as evidence that more than 40% of Westerners have descriptivist intuitions on semantic reference. The aim of our paper is not merely to question the reliability of Machery et al.’s experiment. In sections 4 and 5 we assess the impact of our survey on the current debate in experimental semantics. We provide a novel account of the nature of the epistemic ambiguity that affects experiments in theory of reference and explain the consequences that our account of the epistemic ambiguity has for subsequent works trying to avoid ambiguities.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 99,533

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Experimental Semantics.Michael Devitt - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):418 - 435.
Theories of Reference, Experimental Philosophy, and the Calibration of Intuitions.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2017 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 32 (1).
Kripke’s Gödel case: Descriptive ambiguity and its experimental interpretation.Chao Ding & Chuang Liu - 2022 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 37 (3):291-308.
Counteractuals, Counterfactuals and Semantic Intuitions.Jesper Kallestrup - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):35-54.
Teorías de la referencia, filosofía experimental y calibración de intuiciones.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2017 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 32 (1):41-62.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-06-01

Downloads
62 (#283,655)

6 months
14 (#176,829)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

References found in this work

Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Reference and definite descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
On referring.Peter F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.

View all 34 references / Add more references