Pleonastic entities: Fictional characters and propositions

Philosophical Investigations 32 (1):65-78 (2009)
Abstract
Stephen Schiffer holds that propositions are pleonastic entities. I will argue that there is a substantial difference between propositions and fictional characters, which Schiffer presents as typical pleonastic entities. My conclusion will be that if fictional characters are typical pleonastic entities, then Schiffer fails to show that propositions are pleonastic entities.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2008.01362.x
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The Things We Mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Language-Created Language-Independent Entities.Stephen Shiffer - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (1):149-167.
The Things We Mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):395-395.

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