Propositions: What They Could and What They Could not Be

Abstracta 2 (2):129-147 (2006)
I defend the Fregean model of propositions: propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses and (b) structured entities made of concepts. Schiffer (2003) has presented a group of arguments against the Fregean model and advanced an alternative view: propositions are unstructured pleonastic entities. My purpose is twofold: (i) to counter each of his arguments sketching the guidelines for a theory of concepts as basic constituents of propositions; (ii) to maintain that the notion of pleonastic entity is not robust enough for claiming the existence of propositions.
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