Freedom, foreknowledge, and the principle of alternate possibilities

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-23 (2000)
Abstract
The traditional debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists was based on the assumption that if determinism deprives us of free will and moral responsibility, it does so by making it true that we can never do other than what we actually do. All parties to the debate took for granted the truth of a claim now widely known as "the principle of alternate possibilities": someone is morally responsible only if he could have done otherwise. In a famous paper, Harry Frankfurt argued that the principle of alternate possibilities is false. I argue that Frankfurt's argument rests on a modal fallacy
Keywords Ethics  Foreknowledge  Freedom  Responsibility  Frankfurt, H
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00455091.2000.10717523
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,812
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Metaphysics of Free Will.John Martin Fischer - 1996 - Religious Studies 32 (1):129-131.
The Principle of Alternate Possibilities.David C. Blumenfeld - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (March):339-44.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.
Frankfurt Versus Frankfurt: A New Anti-Causalist Dawn.Ezio Di Nucci - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):117-131.
Finking Frankfurt.Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):363--74.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
122 ( #45,946 of 2,231,601 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #37,982 of 2,231,601 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature