An Asymmetrical Approach to Kant's Theory of Freedom

In Dai Heide and Evan Tiffany (ed.), The Idea of Freedom: New Essays on the Interpretation and Significance of Kant's Theory of Freedom (forthcoming)

Authors
Benjamin Vilhauer
City College of New York (CUNY)
Abstract
Asymmetry theories about free will and moral responsibility are a recent development in the long history of the free will debate. To my knowledge, Kant commentators have not yet explored the possibility of an asymmetrical reconstruction of Kant's theory of freedom, and that will be my goal here. By "free will", I mean the sort of control we would need to be morally responsible for our actions. Kant's term for it is "transcendental freedom", and he refers to the attribution of moral responsibility as "imputation". By "Kant's theory of freedom", I mean not only his theory of transcendental freedom and imputation, but also the various ways in which he draws on these ideas in his moral theory.
Keywords Kant  Transcendental Freedom  Free Will Skepticism  Asymmetry  Praise  Blame  Retribution
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Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2001 - Mind 110 (437):271-274.

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