Belling the cat: Why reuse theory is not enough

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):293-294 (2010)
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Abstract

I agree with Anderson's approach to reuse theories. My main concern is twofold. Anderson assumes certain nomological regularities in reuse phenomena that are simply conjectures supported by thin evidence. On the other hand, a biological theory of reuse is insufficient, in and of itself, to address the evaluation of particular models of cognition, such as concept empiricism or conceptual metaphor

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``Two'' many optimalities.Oscar Vilarroya - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (2):251-270.
From functional mess to bounded functionality.Oscar Vilarroya - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (2):239-256.

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