Extended functionalism, radical enactivism, and the autopoietic theory of cognition: prospects for a full revolution in cognitive science


Authors
Mario Villalobos
University of Edinburgh
David Silverman
Université Paris Descartes
Abstract
Recently, Michael Wheeler has argued that despite its sometimes revolutionary rhetoric, the so called 4E cognitive movement, even in the guise of ‘radical’ enactivism, cannot achieve a full revolution in cognitive science. A full revolution would require the rejection of two essential tenets of traditional cognitive science, namely internalism and representationalism. Whilst REC might secure antirepresentationalism, it cannot do the same, so Wheeler argues, with externalism. In this paper, expanding on Wheeler’s analysis, we argue that what compromises REC’s externalism is the persistence of cognitively relevant asymmetries between its purported cognitive systems and the environment. Complementarily, we argue that an antirepresentationalist ancestor of enactivism, the autopoietic theory of cognition, is able to deliver and secure externalism, thus offering the explosive combination that Wheeler claims us needed for a revolution in cognitive science.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11097-017-9542-y
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 49,017
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition.Robert D. Rupert - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
The Bounds of Cognition.Sven Walter - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):43-64.
The Natural Origins of Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Glenda Satne - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):521-536.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Non-Representationalist Cognitive Science and Realism.Karim Zahidi - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):461-475.
Spread Mind and Causal Theories of Content.Krystyna Bielecka - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):87-97.
Locked-in Syndrome: A Challenge for Embodied Cognitive Science.Miriam Kyselo & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):517-542.
Inference to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition.Mark Sprevak - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):353-362.
The Complex Systems Approach: Rhetoric or Revolution.Chris Eliasmith - 2012 - Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):72-77.
Extended Cognition and the Metaphysics of Mind.Zoe Drayson - 2010 - Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
Not-Quite-So Radical Enactivism.D. Lloyd - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):361-363.
Cognition.Gary Hatfield - 2014 - In Lawrence Shapiro (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. Routledge. pp. 361–73.
The Enactivist Revolution.Kenneth Aizawa - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):19-42.
Cognition as Shaking Hands with the World. Introduction.Przemyslaw Nowakowski & Tomasz Komendzinski - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):11-16.
Thinking-is-Moving: Dance, Agency, and a Radically Enactive Mind. [REVIEW]Michele Merritt - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):95-110.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-11-05

Total views
36 ( #260,464 of 2,310,674 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #126,558 of 2,310,674 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature