Free will skepticism and personhood as a desert base

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 489-511 (2009)
Abstract
In contemporary free will theory, a significant number of philosophers are once again taking seriously the possibility that human beings do not have free will, and are therefore not morally responsible for their actions. Free will theorists commonly assume that giving up the belief that human beings are morally responsible implies giving up all our beliefs about desert. But the consequences of giving up the belief that we are morally responsible are not quite this dramatic. Giving up the belief that we are morally responsible undermines many, and perhaps most, of the desert claims we are pretheoretically inclined to accept. But it does not undermine desert claims based on the sheer fact of personhood. Even in the absence of belief in moral responsibility, personhood-based desert claims require us to respect persons and their rights. So personhood-based desert claims can provide a substantial role for desert in free will skeptics' ethical theories.
Keywords free will skepticism  free will  Kant  persons  personhood  desert  rights
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DOI 10.1353/cjp.0.0052
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References found in this work BETA
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.Kadri Vihvelin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):427-450.
The Objective Attitude.Tamler Sommers - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):321–341.
Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.

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Citations of this work BETA
Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):235-252.
Persons, Punishment, and Free Will Skepticism.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):143-163.
A Strawsonian Look at Desert.Adina L. Roskies & Bertram F. Malle - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):1-20.

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Desert Tracks Character Alone.Stephen Kershnar - 2008 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):71-88.
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Persons, Punishment, and Free Will Skepticism.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):143-163.

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