Ratio Juris 22 (1):110-127 (2009)

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Abstract
In this paper I put forward some arguments in defence of inclusive legal positivism . The general thesis that I defend is that inclusive positivism represents a more fruitful and interesting research program than that proposed by exclusive positivism . I introduce two arguments connected with legal interpretation in favour of my thesis. However, my opinion is that inclusive positivism does not sufficiently succeed in estranging itself from the more traditional legal positivist conceptions. This is the case, for instance, with regard to the value-freedom principle, which is commonly accepted by inclusive positivist scholars. In contrast with this approach, I try to show, in the concluding section, how a constructivistic version of inclusive positivism could legitimately acknowledge the presence of value-judgments in the cognitive activities of jurists and legal theorists.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2008.00415.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford University Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Ways of Worldmaking.Nelson Goodman - 1978 - Harvester Press.
Law’s Empire.Ronald Dworkin - 1986 - Harvard University Press.

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