The Concept of Mind and Cognition in the Autopoietic Theory

Constructivist Foundations 18 (1):26-27 (2022)
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In contrast to Capra’s interpretation of Maturana’s work, I argue that the autopoietic theory does not establish an intrinsic, necessary link between life and cognitive/mental phenomena, and that given its functionalist approach, the theory helps very little to overcome the Cartesian division between mind and body.



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Mario Villalobos
University of Edinburgh

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