Blame, desert and compatibilist capacity: a diachronic account of moderateness in regards to reasons-responsiveness

Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):1-17 (2013)

Authors
Nicole A. Vincent
University of Technology Sydney
Abstract
This paper argues that John Fischer and Mark Ravizza's compatibilist theory of moral responsibility cannot justify reactive attitudes like blame and desert-based practices like retributive punishment. The problem with their account, I argue, is that their analysis of moderateness in regards to reasons-responsiveness has the wrong normative features. However, I propose an alternative account of what it means for a mechanism to be moderately reasons-responsive which addresses this deficiency. In a nut shell, while Fischer and Ravizza test for moderate reasons-responsiveness by checking how a mechanism behaves in a given time slice across other possible worlds, on my account we should ask how that mechanism behaves in this world over a span of time – specifically, whether it responds to reasons sufficiently often. My diachronic account is intended as a drop-in replacement for Fischer and Ravizza's synchronic account.
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2013.787443
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References found in this work BETA

Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):494-497.

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Citations of this work BETA

Scaffolding Agency: A Proleptic Account of the Reactive Attitudes.Victoria McGeer - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):301-323.
A Compatibilist Theory of Legal Responsibility.Nicole A. Vincent - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (3):477-498.

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