Book Review: Guy Axtell: Problems of Religious Luck. Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement. Lanham: Lexington Books 2019 [Book Review]

Wittgenstein Studien 11:319-330 (2019)
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Guy Axtell's new book, as the title suggests, is an attempt to assess the limits of reasonable religious disagreement. In trying to delineate those limits Axtell thinks that it is useful to employ the notions of luck and risk in examining how reasonable a particular religious (or atheistic) stance is. A central concern of the book is with religious groups which exclude others in some way and which ascribe traits to those other groups that are very unlike the traits the group ascribes to themselves. For example, a group might describe its own members as being saved but describe members of other similar groups as being lost.



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Robert Vinten
Universidade Nova de Lisboa

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