Models of rationality and the psychology of reasoning: From is to ought, and back


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Abstract
Diagnoses of rationality often arise from the experimental investigation of human reasoning. We suggest that such diagnoses can be disputed on various grounds and provide a classification. We then argue that much fruitful research done with classical experimental paradigms was triggered by normative concerns and yet fostered insight in properly psychological terms. Our examples include the selection task, the conjunction fallacy, and so-called pseudodiagnosticity. We conclude that normative considerations retain a constructive role in the psychology of reasoning, contrary to recent complaints in the literature
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