Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):373-392 (2000)
I discuss two forms of the thesis that to have a sensation is to token a sentence in a language of thought-what I call, following Georges Rey, the sensational sentences thesis. One form of the thesis is a version of standard functionalism, while the other is a version of the increasingly popular thesis that for a sensation to have qualia is for it to have a certain kind of intentional content-that is, intentionalism. I defend the basic idea behind the sensational sentences thesis, and argue that the intentionalist version is either false or collapses into the standard functionalist thesis
|Keywords||Cognitive Science Epistemology Language Sensation Thought Rey, G|
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References found in this work BETA
Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-78.
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That Which Makes the Sensation of Blue a Mental Fact: Moore on Phenomenal Relationism.Benj Hellie - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66.
An Argument Against Dispositionalist HOT.David Jehle & Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):463-476.
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