Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):292-314 (2009)

In specifying the sensory evidence for perceptual belief, thinkers have either chosen a common perceptual idiom or have invented one of their own as a starting-point for their enquiries. It is becoming clearer that the choice harbours crucial, often disputable, assumptions. I compare two sorts of constructions, a variety of propositional ones and an objectual one, and I argue that the objectual idiom is indispensable in order to explain how a perceptual belief can arise out of what is not already a belief. This has implications not only for the question of how belief is generated from perceptual evidence, but also for various other controversies. I discuss two of these implications: the character of inferences from evidence, and basic belief.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.566.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,447
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Lecture I: Sellars on Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (9):431-450.
V—The Rational Role of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 1993 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1):71-88.
Perceptual Content.Gerald Vision - 1998 - Philosophy 73 (3):395-427.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Nonconceptual Mental Content.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Against an Inferentialist Dogma.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1397-1421.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Perceptual Entitlement.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.
Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks.Jack Lyons - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):237-256.
Perception, Generality, and Reasons.Hannah Ginsborg - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 131--57.
Perceptual Knowledge Derailed.Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (1):31-45.
On Having Reasons for Perceptual Beliefs: A Sellarsian Perspective.Dan D. Crawford - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:107-123.
The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification.Peter Markie - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):347-373.
Nondoxastic Perceptual Evidence.Peter J. Markie - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):530-553.


Added to PP index

Total views
83 ( #110,422 of 2,326,368 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #644,397 of 2,326,368 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes