Intensional specifications of truth-conditions: 'Because', 'in virtue of', and 'made true by…'

Topoi 29 (2):109-123 (2010)
Abstract
Although a number of truth theorists have claimed that a deflationary theory of ‘is true’ needs nothing more than the uniform implication of instances of the theorem ‘the proposition that p is true if and only if p ’, reflection shows that this is inadequate. If deflationists can’t support the instances when replacing the biconditional with ‘because’, then their view is in peril. Deflationists sometimes acknowledge this by addressing, occasionally attempting to deflate, ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’ formulas and their close relatives. I examine what I take to be the most promising deflationist moves in this direction and argue that they fail.
Keywords Constitution  Correspondence  Deflationism  Intensionality  Metaphysics  Truth  Truth-makers
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-009-9071-6
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
Conceptions of Truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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