Philosophy Compass 9 (10):713-722 (2014)

Abstract
The relationship of minds, bodies, and persons has been a central topic of debate in Western philosophy and theology. This article reviews the ongoing debates about the relationship and nature of bodies, minds, and persons among contemporary Christian analytic philosophers and theologians. The first two parts present some general theological constraints for philosophical theories of persons and describe the basic concepts used (substance, property, supervenience, and physicalism). The views themselves fall into three broad categories. Dualists think that persons are either identical with or partly constituted by non-physical souls. On this view, there are immaterial substances and properties. Hylomorphists maintain that persons are composites of bodies and the souls that inform them. Finally, physicalists claim that there are no immaterial parts to persons. Instead, persons are composed of bodies and brains, the mental properties they have supervene on physical properties
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DOI 10.1111/phc3.12163
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References found in this work BETA

Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2010 - Routledge.
What Are We?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.
The Emergent Self.William Hasker - 2001 - Cornell University Press.

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